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 A
s the coronavirus disease 2019 
(COVID-19) pandemic continues to 
sweep the globe, several groups have 
been working to develop and self-
administer unapproved, unproven 
interventions that they describe as 
vaccines for COVID-19 ( 1–4). Some of the 
interest in these do-it-yourself (DIY) ap-
proaches apparently stems from a belief 
that self-experimentation is never subject 
to time-consuming ethics board review or 
regulation, such as by the U.S. Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA). This belief 
is legally and factually incorrect, and the 
misunderstanding has potentially impor-
tant public health implications. Any failure 
by the FDA to regulate DIY vaccines would 
permit vaccines of dubious safety and ef-
fectiveness to endanger public health 
and would signal a lowering of standards 
that—in an age blighted by vaccine skepti-
cism and during a highly politicized pan-
demic—could undermine public trust in all 
vaccines, however developed (5). Further, 
some self-experimentation can qualify as 
human subjects research that is required 
to undergo ethics review, by law or insti-
tutional policy. Even when ethics review is 
not required, citizen scientists must take 
seriously their heightened ethical respon-
sibilities when promoting DIY interven-
tions, especially those with potentially 
serious public health and societal effects, 
such as COVID-19 vaccines. Given the pro-
liferation of citizen science efforts to fight 
COVID-19 and the general confusion (even 
among sophisticated scientists) that sur-
rounds the regulation of DIY research, 
regulatory leadership is badly needed. 
“THE FDA CAN’T STOP YOU”
In July 2020, six months after the first case 
of COVID-19 was confirmed in the United 
States, scientists associated with the Rapid 
Deployment Vaccine Collaborative (RaD-
VaC) reported administering to themselves 
a product of their own making that was in-
tended to be a vaccine against the disease. 
As described in the group’s white paper, 
the putative intranasal vaccine consists 
of synthetic peptides that mimic those of 
severe acute respiratory syndrome corona-
virus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), the virus that causes 
COVID-19, and is designed to elicit only a 
local immune response ( 6). 
By its own account, RaDVaC is engaged 
in “citizen science,” which broadly de-
scribes activities having a scientific aim 
that invite public participation. RaDVaC’s 
chosen research path—which involves a 
homemade intervention, an evolving pro-
tocol, and unclear plans for collecting and 
analyzing outcomes data—is in contrast to 
traditional paths to vaccine development, 
which require randomized controlled trials 
(RCTs) with well-defined endpoints, such 
as demonstrated immune responses, and 
protocols concerning the retention and 
use of data. 
Although some citizen scientists have an-
tiregulatory leanings, RaDVaC has explained 
that it is not anti-FDA. Rather, its stated 
mission is a humanitarian one, animated by 
a belief that open, crowdsourced vaccine ef-
forts will hasten the widespread availability 
of a potentially life-saving vaccine through 
development activities that it believes are 
not subject to FDA regulation (6). To that 
end, RaDVaC published on the internet in-
structions on how to self-manufacture and 
self-administer its DIY vaccine. RaDVaC also 
has provided materials for those activities, 
reporting as of several weeks ago the deliv-
ery of vaccine materials to 70 individuals (1). 
RaDVaC has made clear to potential users 
that its vaccine has not been reviewed or ap-
proved by the FDA. It also believes, as one of 
its leading scientists stated, “If you are just 
making it and taking it yourself, the FDA 
can’t stop you” (1). 
RaDVaC is not alone. A small group of 
biohackers known as Project McAfee—after 
the antiviral software—reconstructed and 
injected themselves with a vaccine previ-
ously tested only in monkeys (2). Other 
known DIY COVID-19 vaccine efforts in 
the United States include a biohacker who 
self-administered a DIY vaccine that has 
reportedly been taken by at least 10 other 
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people (3) and a microbiologist and founder 
of a small biotech company who sold and 
administered an unapproved vaccine to 
about 30 people (4). Given the global reach 
of the disease and widespread involvement 
of citizen scientists in biomedical activities, 
other efforts are likely under way, both in 
the United States and elsewhere. 
THE FDA AND SELF-EXPERIMENTATION
In the United States, it is true that the FDA’s 
authority does not extend to some instances 
of self-experimentation, for which there is 
a long tradition in medicine, including vac-
cine self-experimentation (7, 8). But self-
experimentation, for the FDA’s purposes, 
is a narrow category. The FDA’s jurisdic-
tion would not extend to a citizen scientist 
insufflating an experimental vaccine that 
they created entirely from materials around 
their house. Nor would it extend to the dis-
tribution of only information about a DIY 
vaccine, such as suggestions for where to ac-
quire materials or instructions for making 
and self-administering it ( 9). 
However, the FDA does have jurisdic-
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tation. Under U.S. federal law, the FDA is 
authorized to regulate vaccines that cross 
state lines. This includes not only the final 
product itself but also more mundane in-
termediate components, such as reagents 
(9). The FDA’s authority covers such vac-
cines regardless of whether they are de-
veloped by traditional industry players or 
citizen scientists; administered by a health 
professional or the patient; or, in many 
cases, sold for money or freely given away. 
The FDA’s authority is meant to be broad 
and national in scope rather than leaving 
things to a fractured pattern of state reg-
ulation or jurisdiction that turns on fine 
technicalities of how money may or may 
not have changed hands. This ensures that 
manufacturers and distributors do not eas-
ily escape expert public health oversight. 
Distributing materials intended for the 
self-manufacture of any vaccine therefore 
falls squarely within the FDA’s jurisdiction 
and its public health mission.   
Other self-experimentation projects have 
similarly crossed the line into FDA-regu-
lated product development. For example, 
in late 2017, in response to concerns about 
DIY gene-editing kits, the FDA stated that 
any distribution of gene editing materials 
intended for use in humans qualifies as 
gene therapy subject to the FDA’s require-
ments (10). This reach of the FDA’s author-
ity is justified. When self-experimenters 
provide interventions or their components 
to others who might follow in their foot-
steps, this has a serious potential to injure 
other experimenters, among other nega-
tive externalities. 
THE COMMON RULE AND ETHICS 
An FDA-authorized Investigational New 
Drug (IND) application permits unap-
proved drugs (and their components) to le-
gally cross states lines and be investigated 
in humans, subject to certain require-
ments, including approval by an Institu-
tional Review Board (IRB). Additionally, 
even with respect to DIY vaccines outside 
the FDA’s authority, research with human 
participants is independently regulated 
in the United States by the Common Rule 
when the research is federally conducted 
or funded. Most self-experimentation is 
neither, but research institutions’ own pol-
icies generally subject all human partici-
pant research in which the institution is 
“engaged” to the Common Rule’s require-
ment of advance review by an IRB. IRBs 
help ensure that a study’s risks are reason-
able in relation to its expected benefits 
and that participants provide voluntary, 
informed consent. So long as a self-experi-
ment meets the Common Rule’s definition 
of “research” and the self-experimenter’s 
institution is engaged in that research—
say, because it occurs on institutional 
property or uses institutional resources—
self-experimentation likely requires IRB 
review (11). RaDVaC’s early systematic ef-
forts to develop their product clearly meet 
this definition of research, but there is no 
evidence that any research institution was 
engaged in it.
Whether or not required by federal law 
or institutional policy, the kind of indepen-
dent, prospective review that IRBs provide 
is ethically important, especially for public 
health interventions. Although the harms 
of some DIY interventions tend to be con-
fined to the researchers themselves, DIY 
vaccines have the potential to harm others, 
directly and indirectly. 
Those potential harms are evident. Both 
users and bystanders are harmed by inef-
fective vaccines when users’ false reassur-
ance that they are immune from infection 
causes them to take risks that they might 
not otherwise take, such as traveling in 
crowds. Users of a DIY vaccine might also 
be unwilling or ineligible to participate in 
future clinical trials for traditional vac-
cines. The COVID-19 pandemic has al-
ready seen widespread off-protocol use of 
unproven interventions frustrate attempts 
to rigorously evaluate those or other in-
terventions (12). At the same time, polls 
show that many are reluctant to take any 
COVID-19 vaccine. If scientists—and es-
pecially those with elite training or affili-
ations—herald a readily available vaccine, 
those who are not hesitant might refuse to 
take the risk of enrolling in a trial and be-
ing randomized to placebo.
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Making an untested DIY vaccine accessi-
ble to the general public also runs the risk, 
as RaDVaC’s white paper acknowledges, 
that lay users might injure themselves as 
a result of improper preparation, incor-
rect administration, or heightened allergic 
or other reactions. These risks raise ques-
tions about whether such users are able to 
give meaningful consent to a DIY vaccine. 
As demonstrated by reports of 
desperate individuals drinking 
cleaning products in an effort to 
prevent or treat COVID-19, not 
all individuals attracted to DIY 
vaccines will have the technical 
know-how to safely engage in 
self-experimentation or will in-
vest the time to learn how to do so. Experts 
can sometimes suffer from a curse of knowl-
edge that leads them to underestimate the 
risk that less sophisticated users may flub 
their instructions.
Last, it is concerning that RaDVaC ap-
parently hopes for its DIY vaccine to be 
very widely adopted but has not disclosed 
any plans for systematically establish-
ing its safety or efficacy, such as through 
RCTs. During a pandemic, it is tempting 
to believe that an intervention that shows 
early promise has been “proven enough” to 
justify widespread use (13). Those who are 
intellectually invested in an intervention 
may be especially so tempted, perhaps even 
deeming RCTs, which randomize some 
participants to placebo, unethical (14). All 
scientists must resist the temptation to 
view the rigorous study of COVID-19 vac-
cine safety and effectiveness as a bureau-
cratic step that can be skipped. Research 
that enables us to confidently conclude 
that a vaccine is safe and effective will take 
time, whether or not it is overseen by the 
FDA. But that research, simply, is critical.  
ROLES FOR THE FDA AND SCIENTISTS
Given the risks to public health from un-
safe or ineffective vaccines, regulatory 
leadership is needed. First, the FDA should 
issue a statement clarifying both its au-
thority over, and its intent to regulate, 
DIY COVID-19 vaccines, as it did with DIY 
gene-editing kits. This statement should 
include, at a minimum, clarification that 
vaccine research, manufacture, distribu-
tion, and administration—by anyone—can 
be subject to regulation. For those activi-
ties within its jurisdiction, the FDA has a 
range of enforcement tools available to it, 
including sending Warning Letters and im-
posing civil and criminal penalties. Indeed, 
the FDA has already sent a Warning Let-
ter to one company, North Coast Biologics, 
whose founder sold and administered an 
unapproved COVID-19 vaccine to friends 
(4). Explaining how the FDA intends to en-
force its authority against citizen science 
groups can help give fair warning to those 
who might underestimate the scope of FDA 
jurisdiction as well as reassure those who 
are not likely to face enforcement actions. 
Although appropriate enforcement of 
the FDA’s authority is critical, the objec-
tive should not be to stop all citizen sci-
ence research; that would be futile given 
the popularity and reach of citizen science. 
But more importantly, such a strategy 
would imprudently deny society the many 
benefits of citizen science, including its po-
tential contributions to scientific discovery 
(9, 15). In recognition of these benefits, 
the FDA should consider ways to support 
citizen science research while promoting 
trust in FDA and research processes, in-
cluding establishing new channels for en-
gaging with citizen scientists working on 
COVID-19 solutions. One possibility is to 
designate FDA staff knowledgeable about 
citizen science objectives and communities 
to field questions from citizen scientists, 
provide feedback on their projects (such 
as through pre-IND meetings, which are 
an established way for the FDA to discuss 
product development plans), and, as nec-
essary, help citizen scientists connect with 
other staff within the FDA with relevant 
scientific expertise. More citizen scientists 
would be encouraged to reach out to the 
FDA if it were easy for them to identify an 
office to call with questions. This would re-
quire the person speaking with them to be 
genuinely invested in helping them—even 
if that ultimately means explaining how a 
project might violate FDA rules. 
By adopting a transparent, collaborative 
approach to citizen science, the FDA can 
encourage trust, which is particularly im-
portant right now amid concerns about po-
litical interference with the FDA’s work. At 
the same time, the FDA can stay apprised 
of promising solutions that may emerge 
from these communities, as well as their 
failures. During a pandemic, this is pre-
cisely the kind of information that regula-
tory authorities should want to know—and 
without delay. 
Although many citizen scientists appear 
to take seriously the ethical responsibili-
ties associated with their activities, it is 
important to recognize that those respon-
sibilities expand when public health is at 
stake, such as with COVID-19 vaccine de-
velopment. Characterizing or positioning 
research as self-experimentation does not 
eliminate risks to bystanders or the col-
lective good. Given those potential risks, 
citizen scientists who are involved in open 
vaccine development and testing efforts 
outside of traditional scientific institutions 
should seek review by an independent 
IRB. The cost is not necessar-
ily prohibitive for all projects 
and should be prioritized the 
same as critical safety equip-
ment. Ethical and efficient de-
velopment of a vaccine shown 
to be safe and effective against 
COVID-19, and broad dissemi-
nation of such a vaccine, are goals we all 
share and should be able to work together 
to achieve.  j
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